|HR 1838 IH
H. R. 1838
To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,
and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 18, 1999
Mr. DELAY (for himself, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. GILMAN, Mr.
DEUTSCH, Mr. ROHRABACHER, Mr. WU, Mr. COX, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mrs. LOWEY, Mr.
SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. COOK, and Mr. WELDON of
Florida) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
To assist in the enhancement of the security
of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Security
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since 1949, the close relationship between the United
States and Taiwan has been of enormous benefit to both societies.
(2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a major political transformation, and Taiwan is
today a true multiparty democracy with a political system separate from and totally unlike
that of the People's Republic of China.
(3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free market principles and is separate and
distinct from the People's Republic of China.
(4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United States Government withdrew diplomatic
recognition of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China, neither at
that time nor since has the United States Government adopted a formal position as to the
ultimate status of Taiwan other than to state that status must be decided by peaceful
means. Any determination of the ultimate status of Taiwan must have the express consent of
the people on Taiwan.
(5) The government on Taiwan no longer claims to be the sole legitimate government of all
(6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8) states that -
(A) peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area are in
the political, security, and economic interests of the United States and are of
(B) the decision of the United States to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that
the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(C) the United States would consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific region and of grave
concern to the United States;
(D) the United States will maintain the capacity to resist
any form of coercion that jeopardizes the security, or the social or the economic system,
of the people on Taiwan; and
(E) the preservation and enhancement of the human rights
of all the people on Taiwan are objectives of the United States.
(7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan Relations
Act establishes on the part of the United States a continuing connection with and concern
for Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain themselves free of coercion and free
of the use of force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of forces adequate for defense
and deterrence is in the interest of the United States in that it helps to maintain peace
in the Taiwan Strait area.
(8) Since 1954, when the United States and Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, the
United States and Taiwan have maintained a defense and security relationship that has
contributed greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan and the East Asia and
(9) The United States and Taiwan no longer conduct joint training missions, have no direct
military lines of communication, and have only limited military-to-military contacts. This
lack of communication and interoperation between the United States and Taiwan hinders
planning for the defense of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event of future
aggression against Taiwan.
(10) Since 1979, the United States has continued to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and such sales have helped Taiwan maintain its
autonomy and freedom in the face of persistent hostility from the People's Republic of
China. However, pressures to delay, deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been
prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982 communique with the People's Republic
of China. Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions could prevent Taiwan from
maintaining a sufficient capability for self-defense.
(11) As has been affirmed on several occasions by the executive branch of Government, the
provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal precedence over any communique with the
People's Republic of China.
(12) The People's Republic of China has consistently refused to renounce the use of force
against Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened force against Taiwan, including implied
threats by unnamed People's Republic of China officials on January 10, 1999, who warned
Taiwan not to participate in the development of theater missile defense capabilities with
the United States.
(13) The missile firings by the People's Republic of China near Taiwan in August 1995 and
March 1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of the People's Republic of China to use
forceful tactics to limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
(14) As most nations in East Asia reduce military spending, the People's Republic of China
continues a major and comprehensive military buildup.
(A) This military buildup includes the development of
advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that will incorporate precision guidance capability
and the construction of new imaging, radar, navigation, and electronic intelligence
satellites that will help target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles.
(B) According to the Department of Defense report entitled "The Security Situation in
the Taiwan Strait," submitted to Congress in February 1999, the size of the missile
force of the People's Republic of China is expected to grow substantially and, by 2005,
the People's Republic of China will possess an `overwhelming advantage' in offensive
missiles vis-a-vis Taiwan.
(C) The Department of Defense has also noted that the People's Republic of China may
already possess the capability to damage satellite optical sensors with lasers, is
researching advanced anti-satellite lasers that could blind United States intelligence
satellites, and is procuring radio frequency weapons that disable electronic equipment.
(D) These missile and anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave threat to Taiwan.
(16) This military buildup also includes the construction
or procurement from abroad of advanced naval systems, including Russian Kilo submarines
that are difficult to detect, Russian technology to assist the development of new
nuclear-powered attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class destroyers armed with
supersonic SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather naval attack
aircraft called the JH-7, and new indigenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be
launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack aircraft. These naval capabilities pose
a grave threat of blockade to Taiwan.
(17) This military buildup also includes the improvement of air combat capabilities by
procuring and co-producing hundreds of Russian Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, seeking to purchase
Russian Su-30 all-weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with advanced air-to-air
missiles such as the Russian R-77 missile and other precision guided munitions,
constructing the indigenously designed J-10 fighter, and seeking advanced airborne warning
and control systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a grave airborne threat to
(18) Because of the introduction of advanced submarines into the Taiwan Strait area by the
People's Republic of China and the increasing capability of the People's Republic of China
to blockade Taiwan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered submarines in order to maintain
a capability to counter a blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare training, and for
(19) Because of the democratic form of government on Taiwan and the historically
nonaggressive foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that Taiwan would use
submarines in an offensive manner.
(20) The current defense relationship between the United States and Taiwan is deficient in
terms of its capacity over the long term to counter and deter potential aggression against
Taiwan by the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
(a) TRAINING OF TAIWAN MILITARY OFFICERS- It is the sense
of Congress that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments
should make every effort to reserve additional positions for Taiwan military officers at
the National Defense University and other professional military education schools
specified in section 2162(d) of title 10, United States Code, and for prospective Taiwan
military officers at the United States Military Academy, the United States Naval Academy,
and the Air Force Academy.
(b) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES- It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of State
should, when considering foreign military sales to Taiwan-
(1) take into account the special status of Taiwan; and
(2) make every effort to ensure that Taiwan has full and timely access to price and
availability data for defense articles and defense services.
SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.
(a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE
IN TAIWAN- Upon the request of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President
shall use funds available to the Department of Defense under the Arms Export Control Act
for the assignment or detail of additional technical staff to the American Institute in
(b) ANNUAL REPORTS- Beginning 60 days after the next round of arms talks between the
United States and Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit a report to
(1) detailing each of Taiwan's requests for purchase of
defense articles and defense services during the one-year period ending on the date of the
(2) describing the defense needs asserted by Taiwan as justification for those requests;
(3) describing any decision to reject, postpone, or modify any such request that was made
during the one-year period ending on the date of the report, the level at which the final
decision was made, and a justification for the decision.
SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.
(a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE CAPABILITIES OF
TAIWAN- Congress finds that any determination of the nature or quantity of defense
articles or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that is made on any basis
other than the defense needs of Taiwan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982,
Communique signed with the People's Republic of China, or any similar executive agreement,
order, or policy would violate the intent of Congress in the enactment of section 3(b) of
the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).
(b) PLAN REGARDING COMBINED TRAINING AND PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS-
(1) DEVELOPMENT- The Secretary of Defense, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, shall develop a plan for the enhancement of programs and
arrangements for operational training and exchanges of personnel between the Armed Forces
of the United States and the armed forces of Taiwan for work in threat analysis, doctrine,
force planning, operational methods, and other areas. The plan shall provide for exchanges
of officers up to and including general and flag officers in the grade of O-10.
(2) REPORT- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
of Defense shall submit a report to Congress, in classified or unclassified form,
containing the plan required under paragraph (1).
(3) IMPLEMENTATION- Not later than 210 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall implement the plan required under paragraph (1).
(c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
MILITARY COMMANDS- Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Defense shall establish secure direct communications between the United
States Pacific military command and the Taiwan military command.
(d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- Subject to subsection (h), the President is authorized to
make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile defense equipment
and related items, including-
(1) ground-based and naval-based missile defense systems;
(2) reconnaissance and communications systems, as may be necessary to target and cue
missile defense systems sold to Taiwan.
(e) SATELLITE EARLY WARNING DATA- Subject to subsection
(h), the President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost,
satellite early warning data.
(f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT- Subject to subsection (h), the President is authorized to make
available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, modern air-defense equipment, including
(1) AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.
(2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne warning and control systems (AWACS).
(3) Equipment to better defend airfields from air and missile attack.
(4) Communications infrastructure that enables coordinated joint-force air defense of
(g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS- Subject to subsection (h), the
President is authorized to make available for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost,
defensive systems that counter the development by the People's Republic of China of new
naval capabilities, including defense systems such as-
(1) diesel-powered submarines;
(2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne systems, capable of detecting new Kilo and
advanced Chinese nuclear submarines;
(3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis destroyers, capable of defeating foreign
supersonic anti-ship missiles; and
(4) communications systems that better enable Taiwan to conduct joint-force naval defense
(h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT- Nothing in this
section supersedes or modifies the application of section 36 of the Arms Export Control
Act to the sale of any defense article or defense service under this section.